Ž w x . 5 neighboring country also see Baumol and Oates 5, pp. 278᎐283 . As an alternative to emission taxes, some international development agencies provide subsidies to foreign regulatory agencies in order to reduce unidirectional emissions since many less developed countries lack basic ''institutional compatibilities'' for market Ž w x. w x based incentives see Russell and Powell 27 . Grossman and Krueger 16 and w x Sanchez 28 note that a weak regulatory infrastructure combined with the expansion of Mexican maquiladoras industry is a possible source of the pollution in the w x border region of Mexico and the United States. Sanchez 28 argues that thé Ž Secretarıa de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologıa or SEDUE the former Mexicań. equivalent of the U.S. EPA suffers from a lack of resources to enforce environmental legislation. In the environmental accord of NAFTA, U.S. and Mexican trade negotiators agreed on financing mechanisms for environmental infrastructure Ž w x . projects in the border region see Baer and Weintraub 3, p. 82 . There is evidence that numerous development organizations provide aid with such intentions. For Ž . example, Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund OECF provides untied environmental aid for the financing of ''pollution abatement activities.'' The Ž . Inter-American Development Bank IDB provides grants specifically to strengthen Ž newly established environmental protection agencies for examples of IDB support, w x. 6 see Russell and Powell 27 . The success of such untied aid depends on the recipient nation's willingness and ability to implement emission-abatement programs.
Although the subsidies to the regulatory agencies may be desirable due to low incomes and weak regulatory infrastructure in developing countries, another problem may arise since the aid is not tied to the level of emissions in many of these programs. 7 We argue that uncertainty regarding the general ability or will of the recipient nation's government to enforce emissions standards is a key factor in determining the level of success of various environmental aid programs. Russell w x and Powell 27 argue that political will plays an important role in determining the success of environmental improvement programs. Under certain conditions, the recipient nation may have very limited incentives to enforce environmental standards. When there is uncertainty regarding the recipient nation's ability or willingness to control emissions, the success of the emissions reduction program is also uncertain. Ž w x Countries may have a strategic incentive to abate pollution in a cooperative setting see Barrett 4 ; w x w x. Viejo et al. 31 ; Petrakis and Xepapadeas 25 . 6 For examples of descriptions of recent project loans by the OECF, see http:rrwww.oecf.go.jp. Additional examples of programs by the IDB may be found in the program section of its web site www.iadb.org. 7 w x Connolly et al. 8 note that organizational inertia in the form of ''a familiar set of preferred solutions'' precludes donor institutions from choosing a more optimal form of environmental assistance. w x Kanbur et al. 18 argue against the conditionality of aid not only because they perceive conditionality to be ineffective, but also because it is very costly to the recipient country if it has a very limited number of w x skilled administrators. Fairman and Ross 15 summarize the literature concerning the real-world w x experience of conditionality as '' a policy instrument that fails more often than it succeeds.'' 8 From a related area, environmental aid for habitat preservation programs often yields less than expected preservation levels and in the worst cases may only result in very limited levels of preservation Ž w x. in the form ''paper parks'' see McNeely 23 . For example, the first debt-for-nature swap was plagued Ž by problems because the Bolivian government did not fully enforce the nominal property rights see w x. w x w x Deacon and Murphy 13 . Bohn and Deacon 6 and Deacon 12 find political instability to be an Ž . important determinant of deforestation a form of disinvestment . Political instability may also explain the low investment in environmental infrastructure in certain countries.
For simplicity, our focus is on the provision of aid to reduce emissions where the type of uncertainty takes the form of asymmetric information regarding the recipient nation's political will to control emissions. We use the standard North᎐South framework to represent the higher and lower income countries and model the aidremissions problem as a two-stage game. We develop a noncooperative model in which a Northern country provides aid to a Southern country with the intention of reducing emissions within the Southern country. 9 However, the Southern country has an incentive to retain high emission levels because a portion of its output is produced in a polluting industry, and the South must engage in costly abatement to reduce its emissions. In the model, we assume that there exists uncertainty regarding the true type of the South, in that it may be tough or weak on pollution, depending on its ability or political will to reduce emissions. In a static situation, this uncertainty leads to lower emissions by a tough type of South, but higher emissions by a weak type. Moreover, this uncertainty leads to less aid than if the North knew the South was weak on pollution, but more aid than if it knew the South was tough. Hence, the tough Southern type gains from the uncertainty about its type, but the weak Southern type loses from the uncertainty.
The effects of this uncertainty on Southern welfare have interesting implications in a dynamic context. In particular, a tough Southern country may have an incentive to choose a high emissions strategy in order to develop a reputation as being weak on pollution. If it successfully develops such a reputation, it will receive Ž higher aid in the future than if it chose a low emissions strategy and revealed its . true type . That is, the Northern aid program may have the unfortunate effect of inducing excessive current emissions by a tough South type intent on disguising its type and reaping future gains from doing so. Even more perversely, the aid may also induce excessive current emissions by a weak South intent on proving its type and thereby reaping future gains. Oddly, it is the North's response to emissions that actually encourages the South to engage in excessively high emissions. Because the North has the goal of reducing emissions, its best response to higher levels of emissions is to provide more aid to the South. This provision of additional aid when confronted with increased emissions reduces the South's cost of reputation building via excessive emissions.
Admittedly, these excessive emissions are a short-run phenomenon because in each case the South must reveal its true type to obtain its future gain, and so the North's uncertainty is resolved. Nevertheless, the same opportunities for excessive emissions return whenever any random shock occurs that can reintroduce uncertainty about the ability or political will of the Southern government to enforce its emissions standards. For example, an election that changes the party in power, a natural disaster, or a currency devaluation could easily cause such renewed uncertainty. Hence, our results about excessive emissions may be particularly pertinent when the polluting country is subject to political instability, since this can lead to the recurrence of uncertainty. Indeed, in this regard our results are w x w x consistent with those of Bohn and Deacon 6 and Deacon 12 , who find empirical 9 w x Buchholz and Konrad 7 consider a cooperative bargaining outcome in which the polluting country chooses irreversible investment in either high or low pollution control technologies in order to affect the threat points. support for the hypothesis that political instability is a source of environmental degradation.
We proceed as follows. In Section II, we derive a static Bayesian model and show how uncertainty affects the levels of aid and emissions. In Section III, we develop a two-stage Bayesian game in which the Southern country may choose a level of emissions in the first stage in order to influence the stage-two level of aid. In Section IV, we provide some conclusions and a brief sketch of how the model could be extended to an infinitely repeated game in which uncertainty recurs systematically. Proofs and technical details are collected in the Appendix.
II. A STATIC BAYESIAN GAME OF AID AND EMISSIONS
We use the North᎐South framework in which polluting industries are located within the South's borders. Environmental quality is assumed to be a normal good for both countries, and the North has a higher income. 10 We assume the North's n Ž n n .
n welfare can be expressed by the utility function U Y , C, q , where Y is its Ž . post-transfer income, C A is its contributions in the form of aid A to the South, n Ž .
11
and q E is its air quality which depends on the level of Southern emissions E. We assume Northern utility is an increasing function of its post-transfer income and air quality. Since the North's post-transfer income is Y n s y n y A, where y n is its exogenous income, aid transfers reduce North's available income.
Contributions are a ''good'' for the North, Ѩ CrѨ A ) 0 and Ѩ U n rѨ C ) 0, if a ''warm glow'' exists. 12 In addition to a warm glow effect, the public choice literature suggests that the contribution level may positively affect the welfare of the aid administrators since they may get utility from maximizing the budget they Ž w x. control see Niskanen 24 . Consistent with this view is the work of Kanbur et al. w x 18 , who find donor countries may have incentives to distribute aid regardless of the results. Since the funding of future projects depends in part on past budgets, delays in the distribution of aid may endanger the livelihood of the staff of the aid agency. Hence, they argue that staff members receive benefits from the distribution of aid that are independent of the project's results. Also, they note that private 10 Depending on a country's position on its environmental Kuznets curve, income, and therefore aid, w x may reduce the country's level of emissions. Grossman and Krueger 16 find an environmental Kuznets curve, in that the level of emissions is an increasing function of GDP to a point and then begins to w x decrease as GDP increases. Selden and Song 30 also find an inverted-U relationship between w x per-capita emissions and per-capita GDP. Lopez 22 provides a theoretical model which supports thé inverted-U relationship between per-capita emissions and per-capita GDP. We assume that the South is w x on the downward sloping portion of its environmental Kuznets curve. Copeland et al. 9 develop a two country general equilibrium model in which untied aid from the North reduces pollution in the South by affecting relative incomes and therefore affecting relative pollution taxes. 11 We assume throughout that all functions are continuously differentiable as often as needed.
12 w x The existence of a warm glow arises in various contexts. For example, Cornes and Sandler 10 provide an impure joint-product model in which a warm glow occurs as a special case. Kahneman and w x Knetsch 17 question the validity of the contingent valuation method since the willingness to pay of survey respondents may be based on the moral satisfaction of contributing to the provision of the public w x good and not the economic value of the good. In an experimental setting, Andreoni 2 finds that subjects are motivated to cooperate due to kindness or a ''warm glow. '' firms within the donor country may benefit from the distribution of the aid and, therefore, pressure the donor agency to distribute the aid in a timely fashion. 13 Because air quality is a normal good and aid reduces post-transfer income, it follows that the marginal utility of air quality is reduced by aid expenditures,
And since air quality is reduced by emissions, this implies that reaction functions are depicted in Fig. 1 . They are negatively sloped because aid increases Southern income, and air quality is a normal good, so the South's best response to an increase in the level of aid is to choose a lower level of emissions, whatever its type. 14 Finally, to insure the designations weak and tough make sense, 13 w x Scheyvens 29 argues that international prestige is a factor in the determination of both the w x magnitude and direction of aid flows from Japan's ODA. Alesina and Dollar 1 find that the direction of foreign aid is influenced more by the political factors, such as UN voting patterns, than economic w x need and policy performance of the recipient nation. Wade 32 shows that the actions of the World Bank were influenced by the environmental movement.
we assume that the marginal utility of emissions is greater for the weak type, . the left the reaction function of the weak type, as also shown in Fig. 1 .
To analyze the North's problem, assume for the moment that it knows the Southern type with certainty. Its problem then is to choose a level of aid to n Ž . maximize its utility, given the level of Southern emissions. We assume V A, E is strictly concave in A for all E, so there exists a unique solution to this maximizan Ž . tion problem for all E. The Northern reaction function is denoted r E . For any n Ž . given level of emissions, r E is the level of aid that maximizes Northern utility. This reaction function is also shown in Fig. 1 . It is positively sloped because the North has a diminishing marginal willingness to pay for air quality, so its best response to an increase in emissions is to increase the aid it provides to the South. 15 Before presenting the Bayesian equilibrium of this game of incomplete information, it is useful to consider the Nash equilibria which would arise in the two possible games of complete information in which the South's type is known with
certainty. First suppose it is common knowledge that the South lacks the political will to abate emissions. Then the Nash equilibrium of this certainty game is the Ž U U . level of aid and level of emissions, A , E , given by the intersection of the W W n Ž . Northern reaction function, r E , and the reaction function of the weak Southern s Ž . type, r A . Next suppose it is common knowledge that the South is a tough type.
Then the Nash equilibrium of this certainty game, A , E , is given by the T T intersection of the Northern reaction function and the reaction function of the s Ž . tough Southern type, r A . These two Nash equilibria are also shown in Fig. 1 .
T
Given the slopes and relative positions of the types of Southern reaction functions, and the slope of the Northern reaction function, it is evident that A U -A U and
That is, the levels of aid and emissions are both lower in the certainty
game with a Southern country that is tough on emissions. Now return to the situation where the North does not know whether the South is a weak or tough type. That is, consider the Bayesian game of incomplete information in which, at the time levels of aid and emissions are chosen, the South has Ž . private information regarding its type i.e., only it knows if it is weak or tough . Formally, the strategy of Southern type t s T, W is a choice of emissions, E , from t its strategy set, S s , the set of feasible emissions. We assume the strategy sets are . for the tough type and V A, E for the weak type. The North's strategy is to W n w n x choose a level of aid from its strategy set, S s 0, y . If ␣ denotes the prior probability that the South is a weak type with low political will to abate emissions, then the North's payoff is its expected utility
Because the North does not know which type it faces, its optimal choice is a best response to both E and E . This Bayesian reaction function is denoted
In terms of Fig. 1 , at the time the levels of aid and emissions are chosen, n Ž . everyone knows the location of the North's reaction function r E . The South knows the location of its reaction function also. However, the North knows only s Ž . s Ž . that the South's reaction function is either r A with probability ␣ or r A with W T probability 1 y ␣. This uncertainty leads to greater aid from the North than it would provide if it knew the South was tough, but less aid than it would provide U Ž . if it knew the South was weak. Note that the lowest emissions, E ␣ , occur if T uncertainty exists and the South is tough. Uncertainly implies that aid is higher, 
Notice, however, that these results from the static game do not provide a complete or plausible explanation for the failure of certain international environmental aid programs. On the contrary, the static game analysis suggests that the donor nation may actually be pleasantly surprised with the effectiveness of the aid. To explain the partial failure of aid programs, we note that the results of Corollary 1 indicate the possibility of strategic, reputation-building behavior in response to environmental aid programs. In particular, a tough Southern type benefits from the Northern uncertainty about its type and, therefore, has an incentive to maintain this uncertainty. Conversely, a weak Southern type benefits from Northern certainty and, therefore, has an incentive to credibly reveal its type. To fully consider reputation building and the implications for the level of emissions and aid, we develop a two-stage Bayesian game in the next section. By considering this two-stage Bayesian game, we hope to provide an alternative explanation of why certain aid programs may fail. 17 Existence follows from our assumptions that the utility functions are continuous, strictly concave, s n n Ž . Ž . and defined on compact and convex strategy sets. Hereafter we also assume r 0 -E, r E -y , W n Ž .
s Ž n Ž .. r 0 ) 0, and r r 0 ) 0, so that the equilibrium values of aid and emissions are interior to the T strategy sets and can be characterized by the first-order necessary conditions. 
III. A TWO-STAGE BAYESIAN GAME OF AID AND EMISSIONS
Consider the possibility of a pooling equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, one Southern type imitates the other by choosing the same level of emissions in stage one, so the North's uncertainty about the South persists in stage two. The imitator necessarily suffers a loss in stage one because to imitate it must choose a level of emissions that does not maximize its stage-one utility. That is, building a reputation as another type is costly because it requires taking a non-optimal action. Neither Southern type will use such a strategy unless it gains from having the uncertainty about its type persist in stage two. Recalling from Corollary 1 that only the tough type gains from uncertainty, it follows that if there is a pooling equilibrium, then it is one in which the tough type imitates the weak type. Hence, strategic, reputation-building behavior in the form of pooling can only serve to increase the level of emissions.
A natural pooling equilibrium to consider is one in which both types choose the level of emissions in stage one that maximizes the current utility of the weak type, 
Ž .
which simply says that the discounted future gain from maintaining the uncertainty about its type exceeds the current cost of imitating the weak type. For this pooling equilibrium, we must also specify Northern beliefs in stage two that are consistent with the stage-one actions taken by both Southern types. In stage two, the North's updated, posterior belief that the South is the weak type depends, in general, upon the level of emissions observed in stage one, E. We Ž . denote this posterior by E . A standard specification of consistent beliefs for such a pooling equilibrium is Now consider the possibility of separation. The natural separating equilibrium is Ž . one in which stage-one strategies are those in the static game, A , E , E s 
Ž . Note that the condition to prevent the tough type from imitating and to support a separating equilibrium is not just the converse of the condition to allow the tough type to imitate and support a pooling equilibrium. The reason is that the effect of imitation on Northern beliefs is different in these types of equilibria. Imitation merely maintains the North's uncertainty about the South's true type in a pooling equilibrium, s ␣ , but would fool the North into believing the South is the weak type in a separating equilibrium, s 1. As a result, the current cost and future benefit associated with imitation also differ in the two types of equilibria, and so Ž .
Ž . 5 is not the converse of 2 . In fact, it is simple to rank these current costs and future benefits. 
Both the incentive to imitate and its associated cost are lower in the pooling equilibrium than in the separating equilibrium. Thus, we cannot conclude that one of these equilibria is more likely than the other. We also cannot conclude that they are mutually exclusive. It is therefore possible that both the pooling equilibrium and the separating equilibrium can simultaneously occur for the same parametric values.
Finally, another outcome of interest is that the weak type might prevent pooling by choosing a stage-one level of emissions that is high enough to force a separating 19 Ž . equilibrium. For example, suppose that 5 does not hold, so separation does not U Ž . occur if the weak type chooses E ␣ in stage one. Then it is possible that the W weak type can distinguish itself by choosing an even higher level of emissions in U Ž . stage one, say E ) E ␣ , and thereby increase the tough type's cost of
imitation to a prohibitive level. Of course, the weak type also suffers a stage-one 19 Again, note that such a forcing equilibrium can generally be constructed for any pooling U Ž . equilibrium, not just the one where the stage-one common level of emissions is E ␣ . W loss of utility from this deviation from static utility maximization. However, if this strategy succeeds and separation occurs, then there is a discounted stage-two gain for the weak type from having its type revealed that may outweigh the stage-one loss.
In stage one of such a separating equilibrium, the Southern weak type chooses U Ž . emissions E ) E ␣ , and the best replies of the North and the Southern tough One necessary condition for this equilibrium is
so the current cost of imitation for the tough type exceeds the discounted future gain at these levels of emissions and aid. Note that there exists a level of emissions U Ž . Ž . E ) E ␣ such that 7 holds with equality at E s E and with strict min W W 1 m i n inequality for E ) E . 21 The other necessary condition is
so the discounted future gain of forcing separation for the weak type exceeds its current cost at these levels of emissions and aid. We assume there exists an U Ž . Ž .
22
E ) E ␣ such that 8 does not hold for any E ) E . 
South is tough, and A , E in stage two if the South is weak, and the beliefs in W W
U
6 with E s E , constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with separation where Ž . U Ž . Ž . This follows from the fact that 7 cannot hold at E s E ␣ if 5 does not hold, but the
U Ž . Notice 8 holds with strict inequality at E s E ␣ , where its right-hand side, the weak type's W 1 W current cost of forcing separation, is 0. However, this cost is not necessarily increasing in E for all
not only decreases the weak type's current utility directly,
Ž . but it also increases it indirectly by increasing Northern aid, A* ␣ ; E . Nevertheless, it seems evident
that increases in E must eventually increase the current cost of forcing separation to a prohibitive
level, so such an E exists. We have constructed a numerical example based on quadratic utility ma x Ž . functions in which this occurs the details of this example are available from the authors upon request .
FIG. 2. Forced separating equilibrium.
This type of separating equilibrium is depicted in Fig. 2 , where we assume the current loss from forcing separation for the weak type is increasing in E for W 1 U Ž . E ) E ␣ , and so is less than the future gain for E -E . These costs are
also drawn so that E -E , and that, at E , the current cost of imitation for min max min the tough type exceeds the discounted future gain. Finally, these are drawn so the cost of imitation for the tough type is low enough to allow imitation at E s W 1 U Ž . E ␣ , so the separation result of Theorem 3 cannot hold in this case.
W
This result shows that one apparently perverse consequence of aid programs is that there may be circumstances in which a politically weak country has an incentive to excessively increase its emissions just to prove that it really is weak. This strategy of excessive pollution to prove its type significantly reduces the effectiveness of aid. Notice, however, that Southern policy failure is not the source of this ineffectiveness of aid. On the contrary, the Southern weak type is acting optimally by excessively polluting in order to guarantee that the North learns its type, because this also guarantees that the North will provide the higher level of aid associated with a weak type in the future.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Since low incomes may be a factor in low environmental quality, pollution may be reduced through the use of aid. However, environmental aid programs often yield uncertain outcomes and many programs are only partially successful. We argue that the uncertainty of the recipient nation's political ability or willingness to abate pollution is an important factor in determining the effectiveness of untied aid related to pollution abatement. Our analysis suggests that policies offering aid that is not tied to observable levels of emissions can be misguided when such uncertainty exists because they induce environment destruction as an optimal policy implementation of the recipient nations due to reputational effects. We model the aidremissions problem as a two-stage game in which the North has incomplete information regarding the South's ability or political will to enforce emission standards. We demonstrate the South gains from uncertainty if it is a tough type, and so has an incentive to excessively pollute in stage one in order to mimic the weak type and prevent the uncertainty from being resolved for the North in stage two. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of both pooling and separating equilibria. We also provide conditions for a separating equilibrium that the weak type forces by excessive pollution. Perversely, aid is the source of higher emission levels in both the pooling and forced separating equilibria. w x w x Bohn and Deacon 6 and Deacon 12 have found empirical evidence that political instability is a source of environmental degradation. Our results are consistent with these findings since the prevalence of political instability implies that uncertainty and the potential for higher emissions may return even after the initial uncertainty has been resolved. For example, consider a stochastic, repeated game in which the constituent game is the two-stage game of Section III. We can think of the two stages in the constituent game as the length of time between elections in the South. Suppose this repeated game begins with nature making a Ž . draw ␣ * from a common knowledge distribution F on the unit interval, where ␣* is the true probability that a randomly selected Southern government is weak. Suppose no players observe ␣*, so each estimates it by the mean of F. At the end of the first constituent game, after the true type of the first Southern government is observed, the common estimate of ␣ * is updated according to Bayes rule. In each Ž . constituent game thereafter, the state history of the repeated game is the current 23 
Ž .
estimate that the South is weak. As long as ␣ * g 0, 1 , the true Southern type is never known with certainty after any election, so the incentive for excessive emissions as dissipative signaling arises again after every election. Admittedly, such a model of the Southern electoral process is very abstract. However, we think this indicates one possible approach to constructing a more realistic model in which shocks to the political system that re-introduce such uncertainty occur at random intervals.
Perhaps the most important lesson of our analysis is that untied environmental Ž aid can be counter-productive in the presence of recurrent uncertainty whatever . its source about the will of the recipient nations to abate emissions. Moreover, related extensions of this model suggest that other environmental aid programs such as debt-for-debt swaps, which occur in an environment with uncertainty, may encourage greater deforestation. As a result, we agree with a referee that the most important extension of our work is to try to determine Northern aid policies that eliminate this incentive for excessive emissions as reputation-building behavior. 
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF THEOREMS

I. Proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary
1 Ž Ž . U Ž . U Ž .. Under our assumptions on the payoffs, A* ␣ , E ␣ , E ␣ is a Bayesian T W s Ž Ž . U Ž .. s Ž Ž . U Ž .. equilibrium if Ѩ V A* ␣ , E ␣ rѨ E s 0, Ѩ V A* ␣ , E ␣ rѨ E s 0, and W W w T T T Ž Ž . U Ž . U Ž .. Ѩ N A* ␣ , E ␣ , E ␣ rѨT W Ž . Ž Ž . . Ž . Ž s Ž . exists an A* ␣ such that f A* ␣ , ␣ s 0, where f A, ␣ s Ѩ N A, r A , T s Ž .. w n Ž s Ž .. x Ž .w n Ž s Ž .. x r A rѨ A s ␣ Ѩ V A, r A rѨ A q 1 y ␣ ѨV A, r A rѨ A . First note W W T Ž U . w n Ž U s Ž U .. x s Ž U . s Ž U . U that f A , ␣ s ␣ Ѩ V A , r A rѨ A ) 0 because r A ) r A s E , T T W T W T T T T n Ž U U . 2 n Ž U . Ž . Ѩ V A , E rѨ A s 0, and Ѩ V rѨ E Ѩ A ) 0. Similarly, f A , ␣ s 1 y ␣ T T W w n Ž U s Ž U .. x s Ž U . s Ž U . U n Ž U U . Ѩ V A , r A rѨ A -0 as r A -r A s E , Ѩ V A , E rѨ A s W T W T W W W W W W 0, and Ѩ 2 V n rѨ E Ѩ A ) 0. Because Ѩ 2 NrѨ A 2 -0, Ѩ 2 V n rѨ E Ѩ A ) 0, Ѩ r s rѨ A -0, W and Ѩ r s rѨ A -0, we have T Ѩ frѨ A s Ѩ 2 N A, r s A , r s A rѨ A 2 Ž . Ž . Ž . T W 2 n s s q␣ Ѩ V A, r A rѨ A Ѩ E Ѩ r rѨ A Ž . Ž . Ž . W W 2 n s s q 1 y ␣ Ѩ V A, r A rѨ A Ѩ E Ѩ r rѨ A -0. Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . T T Ž . Ž . ŽW T T W T W U Ž . U U U Ž . s Ž . s Ž . 2 n E ␣ -E -E -E ␣ . Next, because r A -r A and Ѩ V rѨ E Ѩ A ) T T W W T W Ž . s 0 imply Ѩ frѨ␣ ) 0, A* ␣ iss Ž s Ž .. s Ž s Ž .. w s Ž s Ž .. xŽ s . is, Ѩ V A, r A rѨ A s Ѩ V A, r A rѨ A q Ѩ V A, r A rѨ E Ѩ r rѨ A s T T T T T T T s Ž s Ž .. s Ž s Ž .. Ѩ V A, r A rѨ A ) 0 because Ѩ V A,
II. Proof of Theorem 2
For this two-stage game, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a specification of Ž . Ž . strategies for each player at each stage, A , E , E and A , E , E , and a
specification of Northern stage-two beliefs that the South is the weak type, Ž . conditional on the outcome of stage one, E , such that: the strategies are optimal, given these beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained from these strategies and observed actions in stage one using Bayes' rule whenever possible. Ž . reduces the weak type's total discounted utility. Hence, given the beliefs in 3 , these strategies are optimal.
U Ž . Given these strategies, the North always observes E ␣ in stage one for either W Southern type. Because this conveys no information, using Bayes rule to update its Ž U Ž .. w Ž .x estimate that the South is the weak type gives E ␣ s ␣r ␣ q 1 y ␣ s ␣. W Also, as is well known, any posterior beliefs are admissible when a level of U Ž . emissions other than E ␣ is observed in stage one, because such an action has 0 W probability under these strategies, and Bayes rule gives no information on how to Ž . update events that occur with 0 probability. Hence, the beliefs in 3 are consistent with these strategies. 
III. Proof of Theorem
T W s Ž U . U s Ž U . s Ž U U . s Ž U s Ž U .. r A ) E s r A imply V A , E ) V A , r A . Finally, given W T W W W W W W W T W T Ž . U Ž . s Ž Ž .. aid A* ␣ ,any deviation from E ␣ s r A* ␣ reduces the tough type's
